Consider this: had a geological soil survey been properly done, Chernobyl may well not have happened. Far safer VVERs and not inherently unsafe RBMK reactors would then have formed the basis of the Soviet nuclear build programme.
The original plan in 1970 was to build Soviet reactors with containment domes and base the new nuclear build programme on a powerful reactor (the VVER-1000 design) that used large pressure vessels. But because a soil survey was not properly done and loess soil detected, the far better and safer VVER design lost out to the inherently unsafe RBMK design. The result was a massive loss from loess.
As a starting point, here follows a quote Is Chernobyl dead? Essays on energy: renewable and nuclear6 by Chris Meyer.
“At the time of the Chernobyl accident, the RBMK-1000 reactor programme formed the basis of the Soviet nuclear programme. But why were Soviet nuclear power stations designed without the containment domes that are regarded as standard in the West? The short answer to this question is bad planning in regards to pressure vessels.”
There are currently eight operating RBMKs, all in Russia. They began operation between 1979 (Kursk 2) and 1990 (Smolensk 3).
“While more technical accounts are available, for brevity and clarity this one is based on the summary given by Zhores Medvedev in his book The Legacy of Chernobyl. Limited space here precludes telling the full story, including the selection of the RBMK for Chernobyl against surprisingly strong opposition.
“Unlike the RBMK reactor, which has no pressure dome and, tragically, was considered safe enough not to need one, Soviet scientists realised that a pressurised water reactor (abbreviated as VVER in the Russian equivalent), would need a steel containment dome.
“Producing a steel pressure vessel to contain a nuclear reactor suitable for a nuclear-powered submarine (as first used in the Soviet navy) is difficult enough, but producing a huge steel containment dome large enough for a nuclear power plant requires a major industrial base. And in 1970, the industrial base to produce the huge pressure vessels of 500 to 800 tonnes needed for the large VVER-1000 reactor, intended to be the key to accelerating the development of nuclear energy, did not exist.
“While smaller pressure vessels for smaller VVERs (the first two VVER-440 reactors) could be produced at facilities in Leningrad [now called St Petersburg], it was decided in 1970 to build a completely new plant to produce VVER systems, and transport the huge pressure vessels by barge, using one of the country’s massive rivers. The plant was called Atommash, an abbreviation of ‘atom machinery’.
“That was good planning, but locating the actual plant below a huge hydroelectric dam across the River Don was not. The builders and planners, in a hurry to build the plant and the new town of Volgodonsk, failed to undertake a proper geological survey of the chosen site. The result was disastrous. Water from the nearby Tsimlyanskoye Reservoir, nearly 2,000km2 in area, caused the ground water level to rise, and turned the area of the plant and the town into a swamp, hindering construction.
“By now it was too late to do anything, so, in true bureaucratic style, the problem was hidden. But this particular problem was too big to be covered up, even in the former Soviet Union.”
In their haste to complete the new Atommash facility, Soviet planners therefore made two huge mistakes.
Only after Chernobyl did planners return to the VVER and base all new nuclear plants on it.
Matters come to a head
As an editorial published in the British publication New Civil Engineer on 1 February 19987 pointed out, the soil of the area (loess) tended to collapse if structures were built on it, and special techniques (and foundations, all then well known in the Soviet Union) were required to build on loess ground. This situation was made even worse (and the soil even more unstable) by the second mistake: not detecting the rising water level. [Please fill in the form to continue reading.]
