
Battery energy storage is the fastest-growing category of new grid infrastructure in the world, and by design, it is also some of the most connected. Every BESS site depends on cloud-linked fleet controllers, remote maintenance access and automated dispatch software to do the job of soaking up surplus intermittent renewable power and release it back to the grid within milliseconds when needed.
That same connectivity is now the subject of the most detailed cyber-risk modelling the sector has seen.
In September 2026, cybersecurity firm Centrii published GRIDLOCK, a Monte Carlo analysis of 10,000 simulated attack scenarios against battery fleets in the UK and Texas, US. According to the report, under today’s baseline security practices, there is a 92% probability of a major coordinated attack on either fleet within five years.
Compromising just 29% of the UK’s battery capacity, roughly 400 units, could black out enough of the grid to affect 67 million people. In the US, compromising a mere 5.4% of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas’ fleet (about 1,500 units) is modelled to cause between $12 billion and $65 billion in economic damage.
Pathways to an attack exist
The absence of a recorded attack is not the same as the absence of a pathway. In December 2025, attackers compromised internet-facing control equipment (including edge devices, remote terminal units, and protection relays) across roughly 30 wind and solar sites in Poland.

